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Abstract 
This paper extends an R&D-based growth model of the Rivera-Batiz and Romer-type 
[Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (1991) 531] endogenous growth model by 
embodying a union with elastic labor to investigate the effects of unionization on 
employment and growth by highlighting the essence of internal conflict within the 
union. It is shown that an increase in the union’s bargaining power or a union which is 
more employment-oriented boosts employment and economic growth when the 
balanced growth equilibrium is determinate. On the other hand, if the union is more 
wage-oriented, employment and economic growth are enhanced when the balanced 
growth equilibrium is indeterminate.  
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1. Introduction 
In continental Europe, European countries are characterized by relatively strong labor 
unions, especially in Belgium, Austria and the Scandinavian countries, in which the 
labor union participation rate is in the range of 70-90%. (Layard et al., 1991; Booth, 
1995). By a union is meant that the wage is determined by bargaining and 
approximately 90% of wage contracts are determined through union bargaining in 
continental Europe. Unions play an important role in many high growth countries and 
therefore it is instructive to examine the relationship between unionization and the 
economic growth rate.  
    Unionization will increase the wage above the non-unionized level. High wages 
increase the revenue from introducing a labor-saving technology and thus spur R&D. 
On the contrary, firms argue that the wage increase decreases the profit from an 
innovation. Hence, there is an ambiguous effect in terms of the impact of union wage 
bargaining on the firm’s incentive to invest in research. For example, Menezes-Fihlo 
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and Van Reenen (2003) provide a broad survey of the empirical literature on the effect 
of unions and innovation and conclude that there is no consensus among these studies 
as to the way in which unions affect innovation. Lingens (2006) plots aggregate R&D 
expenditures and union wage coverage for a set of EU15 countries and the US and 
Japan that yields evidence of a negative relationship between investment in research 
and union wage bargaining. Ulph and Ulph (1994) show that the hold-up effect 
dominates in a right-to-manage setting. Haucap and Wey (2004) argue that 
unionization will foster the incentive to invest into research in the situation with 
centralized wage bargaining in which one union through bargaining obtains a uniform 
wage for the two duopolists. However, due to the focus on innovation, R&D has an 
important part to play in the endogenous growth model (Romer, 1990; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). The firms engage in R&D activities since 
they obtain the patent in order to acquire profits, and therefore promote economic 
growth. This paper introduces union-firm bargaining into an R&D-based endogenous 
growth model where firms can improve their productivity by means of R&D in order 
to investigate the relationship between unionization and innovation.   
    In recent years, economists have paid increasing attention to analyzing the 
effects of unionization on long-run economic growth. Palokangas (1996) and Lingens 
(2003) shed light on the role of intersectoral interaction and labor mobility in 
influencing the growth effect of unionization. Irmen and Wigger (2000) develop an 
OLG model that focuses on the role of intergenerational resource allocation and 
altruism in relation to that same effect. Boone (2000) demonstrates that the existence 
of a union dampens the growth rate of the economy. Chang et al. (2007) explore the 
effects of unionization on unemployment, growth and welfare. Other papers analyzing 
the potential effects of unions on economic growth are Faini (1999), De Groot (2001), 
Bräuninger (2000), Palokangas (2004), and Lingens (2007).  
    Some studies which analyze the bargaining that takes place between unions and 
firms place the union in the final goods sector (Irmen and Wigger, 2000; Chang et al., 
2007), and the intermediate case of sectoral bargaining is not considered. Furthermore, 
some studies set it in the intermediate goods sector (Lingens, 2007; Palokangas, 1996). 
However, although they discuss the unionization effect in relation to the long-run 
growth effect, they do not investigate the indeterminacy of the equilibria, and that the 
endogeneity of labor supply can bring about fundamental changes in the stability of 
long-run equilibria (see Benhabib and Farmer, 1994) in the economic growth. More 
specifically, introducing an endogenous labor supply can change the dynamical 
system evaluated at the steady state. Thus, in departing from their analysis, this paper 
sets up the Rivera-Batiz and Romer’s type (1991) R&D-based endogenous growth 
model which takes heterogeneity into account with a union and endogenous labor 
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supply, and uses it to explore the effects of unionization on economic growth by 
highlighting the essence of internal conflict within a union.  
    By setting up a Rivera-Batiz and Romer-type (1991) R&D-based endogenous 
growth model with elastic labor embodying a union, this paper explores the effects of 
unionization on economic growth and the stability of the long-run equilibrium. As for 
the bargaining framework, we follow Clark (1990) whereby both the union and the 
employer’s federation bargain over the wage and employment through the generalized 
Nash bargaining solution. Given such a model, we show that there exist 
non-conflicting effects between the extent of the union being employment-oriented 
and being wage-oriented on the equilibrium level of employment and economic 
growth according to the stability properties of the economy. If the economy is 
indeterminate, a union that is increasingly wage-oriented raises the equilibrium level 
of employment and economic growth. If the economy is determinate, an increase in 
the union’s bargaining power (or where the union becomes more 
employment-oriented) improves the equilibrium level of employment as well as the 
economic growth rate.  
    The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an R&D 
endogenous growth model with a union labor market. Section 3 analyzes the 
dynamics of the model and derives the conditions under which a balanced growth 
path is locally indeterminate. Section 4 analyzes the long-run effects of the 
unionization. Section 5 concludes the paper.   
 
2. The model 
Consider a unionized economy that grows endogenously owing to its being driven by 
R&D with an endogenous labor supply. There are four types of agents in this 
economy: the final goods firms, the intermediate goods firms, the R&D firms and a 
labor union. The final goods firms produce the consumption goods using 
“state-of-the-art” intermediate goods and labor. Each firm in the monopolistically 
competitive intermediate goods sector develops and holds a blueprint, and uses this 
blueprint to produce one kind of product. In addition, we assume that any 
intermediate goods firm can meet the R&D cost needed to secure the net present value 
of profit associated with the new product developed. The R&D activity is assumed to 
involve free entry, and blueprints can be created only through the final goods used in 
research. The labor union exists in the final goods sector and its behavior reflects the 
internal conflict between its being employment-oriented and being wage-oriented 
rather than simply involving a rational maximization of choice. Households derive 
utility from consumption and leisure, and provide their labor elastically to firms. 
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2.1 Final goods firms, the union, and collective bargaining 
 
2.1.1 Final goods firms 
Firms hire labor l  and a continuum of intermediate capital goods ix  to produce the 
final output Y  which can be consumed or invested. The production function of the 
final goods sector takes the following form 
∫=
tn
ittt dixlY 0
αβ
, 10 << α , 10 << β  (1) 
where n  represents the number of varieties of differentiated intermediate goods that 
expands over time due to technological progress. [ ]tni ,0∈  is the range of 
intermediate goods existing at time t . In Eq. (1) we assume that the individual firm’s 
production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale in its internal intermediate 
goods x  and labor l  factors, i.e., 10 <+< βα . This implies that firms have a 
positive profit when the employer’s federation has bargaining power. The total stock 
of producer durables is related to the aggregate capital stock ∫=
tn
itt dixK 0 . 
    Given the production function (1), the representative firm attempts to maximize 
its profit tΠ  as follows 
∫−−=Π
n
ii dixpwlY 0  (2) 
where w  and ip  are the wage rate and the price of intermediate goods in terms of 
the final goods, respectively.1  
 
2.1.2 Union 
Given the assumption of a closed shop union, the union preferences are represented 
by the following modified Stone-Geary utility function 
υυ lwwU −−= 1)( , 10 << υ  (3) 
where U  denotes the utility of the union, w  is the competitive wage, and υ  and 
υ−1  are the extent to which the union is employment-oriented and wage-oriented, 
respectively. The union is wage-oriented if υ  is less than half and is 
employment-oriented if υ  is greater than half. 
  
2.1.3 Collective bargaining 
McDonald and Solow (1981) propose an important framework, the efficient 
bargaining model, in the trade union literature. The model’s central feature is that the 
wage-employment contract negotiated by the employer and the union should be 
efficient. With this feature, we assume that both the union and the employers’ 
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federation bargain over wages and employment through a generalized Nash 
bargaining solution, subject to the final goods firms’ demand for intermediate goods. 
This optimization problem can be expressed as  
θαβθυυθθ −−−
∫∫ −−⋅−=Π−Π⋅−=Ω
1
00
11
,
][])[()()(max n ii
n
ilw
dixpwldixllwwUU   
s.t. Π=
ix
ix maxarg  
where )1,0(∈θ  is the bargaining power of the union, U  is the disagreement point 
of the union, and Π  is the disagreement point of the final goods firm. We assume 
that the bargaining disagreement point results in a zero employment level. The 
impasse utility of both parties is zero, 0=Π=U . 
    By some simple manipulations, the optimal conditions for the wage and 
employment are given by 




−
−
=− ∫
−
n
i dixlwww 0
11 αββ
υ
υ
 (4) 
∫
−






−−
−−
+=
n
i dixlw 0
1
)1(1
)1( αβ
υθ
βαθυβ  (5) 
and the intermediate goods’ inverse demand function is 
    
1−
=
αβα ii xlp  (6) 
Eq. (5) describes the labor demand function. Given a particular level of employment, 
as the union’s bargaining power θ  increases, the negotiated wage rate will rise. 
According to Eq. (6), the rate of return on intermediate goods should be equal to the 
private marginal product of the intermediate goods.  
    Since the labor market is imperfect and characterized by unionization, this 
implies that there is a positive profit for final goods firms. By substituting Eqs. (5)-(6) 
into Eq. (2), the representative final goods firm’s profit function is given by  
∫
−−
−−−
=Π
n
i dixl 0)1(1
)1)(1( αβ
υθ
βαθ
 (7) 
 
2.2 Intermediate goods 
The typical intermediate goods firm produces differentiated goods with a technology 
that requires one unit of capital per unit of intermediate goods ( ii kx = ). Given the 
prevailing rental rate r , each intermediate goods firm produces and sells a slightly 
unique variety of goods ix  to each final goods firm to maximize its profit 
iii xrp )( −=pi  (8) 
subject to the demand function (6). Profit maximization yields the following 
monopoly price 
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α
rppi ==  (9) 
where the parameter α1  represents the intermediate goods firm’s market power. 
Substituting Eq. (9) into Eq. (8), we obtain 
ii rxα
α
pi
−
=
1
 (10) 
 
2.3 R&D 
R&D technology is such that, to develop a new idea, a researcher needs µ  units of 
final goods to develop ideas.2 The production function in the R&D sector is given by 
µ
R
n =&  (11) 
where R  is the amount of final goods devoted to R&D activities, n&  is the number 
of new blueprints created for a given period of time. 
    The research sector’s profit flow is given by 
Rnpnn −= &pi  (12) 
where np  represents the price of a new blueprint. 
By substituting the production function, Eq. (11), into Eq. (12) and due to the 
property of perfect competition in the R&D sector ( 0=npi ), the blueprint cost or 
value is as follows 
µ=np  (13) 
Eq. (13) indicates that the value of the blueprint is equal to its cost. 
    Anyone can have free entry into the business of being an inventor as long as the 
R&D cost secures the net present value of the profit in intermediate goods, that is  
∫
∞
−−
=
t
tr
n dep ωpi
ω )(
 (14) 
    Differentiating the free entry condition in Eq. (14) with respect to time,3 we 
obtain 
n
n
n p
p
p
r
&
+=
pi
 (15) 
where pi  is the profit flow given by Eq. (10). Eq. (15) is a non-arbitrage condition 
which states that the rate of return on bonds, r , equals the rate of return on investing 
in R&D. The R&D rate of return equals the profit rate, nppi , plus the rate of capital 
gain or loss, nn pp& . 
    Substituting Eqs. (10) and (13) into (15) and solving for ix  yields 
                                                 
2
 Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) use this specification in the framework that they describe as the 
lab-equipment model of R&D. 
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α
αµ
−
==
1
xxi  (16) 
Eq. (16) implies that the quantity of all intermediate goods is the same among these 
firms and is fixed through time. 
 
2.4 Households 
There is a continuum of identical infinitely lived households with one unit of time, 
each of which maximizes its lifetime utility  
∫∫
∞
−
−
∞
−
−
−
≡
0
1
0 1
))1((),( dtelcdtelcV tt ρ
ση
ρ
σ
 (17) 
where c  is the individual’s consumption, 10 ≤≤ l  is the individual’s labor supply, 
the positive parameter η  denotes the weight on utility toward leisure, the positive 
parameter σ  denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
consumption, and ρ  denotes the subjective rate of time preference. The 
instantaneous utility function ),( lcV  is seen to be increasing in consumption and 
decreasing in labor supply at a decreasing rate, 0>cV , 0<lV , 0<ccV  and 0>llV . 
Moreover, we assume that the utility function is concave in c  and l−1 , and this 
implies that )1( ηησ +> . 
    The budget constraint faced by the representative household is given by 
crkwlk −+Π+=&  (18) 
    The first-order conditions for this problem are given by 
λσησ =− −− )1()1( lc  (19) 
wlc λη σησ =− −−− 1)1(1 )1(  (20) 
ρλλλ +−= &r  (21) 
the given initial level of equity holdings, and the transversality condition 
0lim =−
∞←
ke t
t
λρ . λ  stands for the shadow price of capital holdings. Dividing Eq. (20) 
by Eq. (19) results in  
w
l
c
=
−1
η  (22) 
Eq. (22) implies that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
leisure is equal to the real wage rate at each point in time. In addition, it represents the 
labor supply function. From Eqs. (19) and (21), a simple manipulation with 0=l&  
yields the standard Keynes-Ramsey rule 
)(1 ρ
σ
−= r
c
c&
 (23) 
Since Eq. (23) is derived from the household’s preference, we refer to it is the 
preference curve, or the consumption growth rate (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). 
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2.5 Equilibrium 
In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms make the same choices, so that xxi = , ppi = , 
pipi =i , and xnK = . Equipped with this knowledge, we summarize the equilibrium 
condition of the economy as follows 
αβ
υθ
βαθυβ xnlw 1)1(1
)1(
−






−−
−−
+=  (5a) 
    
1−
=
αβα xlp  (6a) 
αβ
υθ
βαθ
xnl)1(1
)1)(1(
−−
−−−
=Π  (7a) 
α
αµ
−
=
1
x  (16) 
12 −
=
αβα xlr  (24) 
w
l
c
=
−1
η  (22) 
)(1 ρ
σ
−= r
c
c&
 (23) 
cnxnlxn −−= && µαβ  (25) 
Eq. (25) is the final goods market clearing condition, or the aggregate resource 
constraint of the economy, and can be rewritten as  
n
c
xl
n
n
x −=+ αβµ &)(  (26) 
On the other hand, the labor market clearing condition is that labor demand equals 
labor supply. By substituting Eq. (5a) into Eq. (22), we obtain 
β
α
υθ
βαθυβ
η −
−






−−
−−
+= 1
1
)1(1
)1(1
l
l
x
n
c
 (27) 
Substituting Eq. (27) into Eq. (26) yields 
    





−






−−
−−
+−
+
=
−β
ααβ
υθ
βαθυβ
ηµ 1
1
)1(1
)1(11
l
l
xxl
xn
n&
 (28) 
Eq. (28) is referred to as the technology curve, or the technology growth rate 
(Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). 
 
3. (In)determinacy 
By taking logs and the time derivatives of Eqs. (19) and (27), a simple manipulation 
yields 
ρσηβσ −=
−
−+−−
−
− r
l
l
l
l
l
l
n
n
1
)1())1(
1
(
&&&&
 (29) 
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Assume that nnln &=)(γ  and cclc &=)(γ , which are the technology curve (the 
innovation growth rate) and the preference curve (the consumption growth rate), 
respectively. By solving for l& , we can rewrite Eq. (29) as  
)]()([)(
1 ll
l
ll cn γγ −Λ
−
=
&
 (30) 
where 0)1(1)1)(1()( 11 >−−+−−=Λ −− σσηβ lll , which is implied by the strict 
concavity of the utility function. The dynamic motion of the model is determined by 
the growth rate of innovation and the growth rate of consumption.  
Because l&  in Eq. (30) depends only on l , in order to understand the stability 
properties of the balanced growth equilibrium, we have to identify the sign of dlld &  
evaluated at lˆ . A hat over the variables denotes their stationary values. 
Differentiating Eq. (30) with respect to l , we obtain 






−
Λ
−
=
=
dl
ld
dl
ld
l
l
dl
ld cn
ll
)ˆ()ˆ(
)ˆ(
ˆ1
ˆ
γγ&
 (31) 
The sign of Eq. (31) is in general undetermined due to the ambiguous sign of the 
value in the square brackets. The first term in the square brackets on the right-hand 
side of Eq. (31) is the slope of the technology curve Eq. (28) along the balanced 
growth equilibrium. The second term is the slope of the preference curve Eq. (23). 
Hence, the sign of Eq. (31) depends on the relative slopes of these two curves. If the 
slope of the technology curve is steeper than the slope of the preference curve, then 
0>dlld & , and thus the fixed point lˆ  is a repeller, and the dynamic equilibrium will 
be locally determinate.4 By contrast, if the preference curve is steeper than the 
technology curve, 0<dlld & , and thus the fixed point lˆ  is an attractor, and local 
indeterminacy will emerge in the economy.  
    In Figs. 1-4, the graph for Eq. (31) shows where the curves respond to the 
relative slopes of the technology and preferences. The intersection of these two curves 
denotes the common growth rate of technology and consumption on the vertical axis 
and the equilibrium level of labor on the horizontal axis. The technology curve is 
steeper with respect to the l  axis than the preference curve at the fixed point 0E , as 
illustrated in Figs. 1 and 3, which reflects the local determinacy of the equilibrium. 
Figs. 2 and 4 illustrate the opposite case, which denotes the local indeterminacy of the 
equilibrium.5 
                                                 
4
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    Taken together, we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. A balanced growth path is locally indeterminate (determinate), if and 
only if 0<Ψ ( 0>Ψ ).6 
 
    This proposition identifies a source for the emergence of the local indeterminacy 
of the equilibrium, that is to say, the relative responsiveness of the balanced growth 
rate of technology and the growth rate of consumption to variations in employment, 
which in turn determines the sign of Ψ . Furthermore, if the balanced growth rate of 
consumption is more (less) responsive to changes in the level of employment than the 
growth rate of technology, the equilibrium will display indeterminacy (determinacy).  
In the model for Proposition 1, a necessary condition for indeterminacy is an 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption that is greater than one 
( 1<σ ).7 Moreover, this result is the same as in Shaw et al. (2005) who find a 
determinate balanced growth equilibrium if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
is smaller than 1, and in Pelloni and Waldmann (2000) and Haruyama and Itaya 
(2006), who find that a necessary condition for local indeterminacy is one where the 
intertemporal substitution of consumption is elastic (i.e., 1<σ ). Hence, we have 
Proposition 2: 
 
Proposition 2. Following Proposition 1, when the elasticity of substitution 1−σ  is 
greater than 1, then the balanced growth equilibrium may be locally indeterminate. If 
the elasticity of substitution 1−σ  is equal to or less than 1, then the balanced growth 
equilibrium will be locally determinate. 
 
    According to the dynamics of the model, suppose that the initial level of l  is 
lower than the balanced growth equilibrium level of lˆ , which makes the production 
of final goods lower. On the other hand, a lower l  causes the consumption to rise 
since the consumption and leisure are complementary goods. These two effects 
together mean that fewer resources are devoted to R&D, and describe the economy 
that is located to the south west of the initial equilibrium 0E  in Figs. 1-4. Starting 
from a southwest point of 0E  along the technology curve, whether the economy 
converges to or diverges from the balanced growth equilibrium 0E  will depend on 
whether 0<Ψ  holds or not, namely, on the relative magnitude of the responses of 
nγ  and cγ  to changes in l  (i.e., Eq. (31)).  
                                                 
6
 For the definition of Ψ , see Appendix 1. 
7
 Because the requirement for the utility function is concave, or )1( ηησ +> , we can easily derive 
1<σ , which is the necessary condition for local indeterminacy. 
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    If the technology curve is very sensitive to changes in l  compared to the 
preference curve, the technology curve will be steeper than the preference curve (i.e., 
0>ll& ) as illustrated in Figs. 1 and 3. A point southwest of 0E  indicates that the 
growth rate of consumption is greater than that of technology, and that the level of l  
is lower than lˆ . The lower initial level l  means that in the next period labor will 
decline because of 0>ll& . This fall in l  causes the economy to move away from 
the balanced growth equilibrium, the economy is unstable and thus the l  should 
jump to the balanced growth equilibrium level. The balanced growth equilibrium is 
determinate. 
    By contrast, if the preference curve is very sensitive to changes in l  compared 
to the technology curve, the preference curve will be steeper than the technology 
curve (i.e., 0<ll& ), as illustrated in Figs. 2 and 4. A point south west of 0E  
indicates that the growth rate of technology is higher than that of consumption, and 
the level of l  is lower than lˆ . The lower initial level of l  means that in the next 
period labor will increase because of 0<ll& . As a result, l  and nγ  can gradually 
return to the balanced growth equilibrium along the technology curve, and the 
balanced growth equilibrium will be stable, that is, indeterminate.  
 
l
γ
0E
1E
 
Fig. 1. The effects of an increase in the union’s bargaining power θ  (or the extent to 
which the union is employment-oriented υ ) in a determinate equilibrium 
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l
γ
0E
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Fig. 2. The effects of an increase in the union’s bargaining power θ  (or the extent to 
which the union is employment-oriented υ ) in an indeterminate equilibrium 
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γ
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Fig. 3. The effects of an increase in the extent to which the union is wage-oriented 
υ−1  in a determinate equilibrium 
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γ
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Fig. 4. The effects of an increase in the extent to which the union is wage-oriented 
υ−1  in an indeterminate equilibrium 
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4. Growth effects of unionization 
We investigate the long-run impact of unionization (union bargaining power θ , the 
extent to which the union is employment-oriented υ , and the extent to which the 
union is wage-oriented υ−1 ) on the balanced growth path of the present model. We 
examine the effects of changes in the union’s bargaining power, the extent to which 
the union is employment-oriented, and the extent to which the union is wage-oriented 
on the level of employment and thus on the growth rate along the balanced growth 
path. 
    In the steady state, 0=l&  in Eq. (30). Totally differentiating Eq. (30) with 
respect to θ , υ , υ−1  yields 
2)1(
1)1(1ˆ
θυθ
υ
β
βα
ηθ +−
−−−
Ψ
=
l
d
ld
 (32) 
2)1(
)1(1)1(1ˆ
θυθ
θθ
β
βα
ηυ +−
−−−−
Ψ
=
l
d
ld
 (33) 
2)]1(1[
111
)1(
ˆ
υθ
θθυ
β
βα
ηυ −−
−−−−
Ψ
=
−
l
d
ld
 (34) 
which reveals that the effects of a change in the union’s bargaining power, the extent 
to which the union is employment-oriented, and the extent to which the union is 
wage-oriented on the equilibrium level of employment is governed solely by the sign 
of Ψ ; that is, on whether the balanced growth path displays local determinacy or 
indeterminacy. In fact, a higher degree of union bargaining power or a higher extent to 
which the union is employment-oriented or a lower extent to which the union is 
wage-oriented raises (reduces) the level of employment, if and only if the balanced 
growth path displays local determinacy (indeterminacy).  
 
Proposition 3. An increase in the union’s bargaining power (or the extent to which 
the union is employment-oriented) raises (reduces) the equilibrium level of 
employment as well as the balanced growth rate, if and only if the balanced growth 
equilibrium is locally determinate (indeterminate). Conversely, an increase in the 
extent to which the union is wage-oriented reduces (raises) the equilibrium level of 
employment and the balanced growth rate, if and only if the balanced growth 
equilibrium is locally determinate (indeterminate). 
 
    Differentiating Eq. (28) with respect to θ , we obtain  
θβυθ
βαθυ
η
ββ
µ
β
θ
γ αβ
d
ldl
x
xl
d
d n ˆ
))1(1(
)1(1
ˆ)1(1
ˆ 11












−−
−−
+
−+
+
+
=
−−
 (35) 
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This amounts to  
)sign()
ˆ
sign()sign( Ψ==
θθ
γ
d
ld
d
d n
 (36) 
This positive association between the growth rate and the level of employment is 
apparently consistent with Figs. 1 and 2. In addition to the union’s bargaining power, 
we also have the same result for the extent to which the union is employment-oriented 
υ . However, according to the extent to which the union is wage-oriented υ−1 , we 
have the opposite effect when compared with the effect of the union’s bargaining 
power on the growth rate and level of employment which is consistent with Figs. 3 
and 4. 
    Suppose that the economy is initially at the balanced growth equilibrium 0E  in 
Figs. 1-4. At first, we consider an unanticipated and permanent increase in the union’s 
bargaining power (or the case where the union is employment-oriented) and this shifts 
the technology curve downward.8 However, the resulting effects on the level of 
employment and the balanced growth rate depend on the stability characteristics of 
the equilibrium, namely, the relative slopes of the technology and preference curves.  
    In Fig. 1, the technology curve is steeper than the preference curve, thereby 
depicting a determinate equilibrium case. The new equilibrium 1E  features larger 
values of both l  and γ  that are generated when the technology curve shifts 
downward. At the old equilibrium 0E , the steady state growth rate of consumption is 
larger than that of technology, and thus the ratio nc  begins to increase, the 
employment falls which in turn further drives the economy away from the new 
balanced growth equilibrium. As a result, the economy must jump to the new 
balanced growth equilibrium. Hence, the economy is unstable and thus the balanced 
growth equilibrium is determinate. To provide intuition for this result, an increase in 
union bargaining power (or where the union is employment-oriented) will increase the 
demand for labor and thus increase the employment level. This will increase the 
intermediate goods used because the labor and capital are technical complements. 
Thus, the more resources that are devoted to R&D, the higher the economic growth 
rate that will result.  
    In the case of an indeterminate balanced growth equilibrium, the preference 
curve is steeper than the technology curve, as shown in Fig 2. Increasing the union’s 
bargaining power (or the extent to which the union is employment-oriented) will 
cause the technology curve to shift downward. The new equilibrium 1E  featuring a 
smaller l  and a smaller γ  will be generated. Because the ratio nc  increases, 
employment decreases. This movement in l  induces the economy to gradually 
approach the new balanced growth equilibrium. An increase in union bargaining 
                                                 
8
 See Eqs. (A6) and (A7) in Appendix 2. 
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power (or the extent to which the union is employment-oriented) leads to a decrease 
in the final goods firm’s bargaining power, which will decrease the profit obtained by 
the final goods firm. This will reduce the employment of labor in production, and thus 
reduce the intermediate goods used because the labor and capital are technical 
complements. Hence, the fewer the resources that are devoted to R&D activities, the 
less economic growth that will be generated.   
    To consider the growth effect of the union’s membership power, which is the 
extent to which the union is wage-oriented, we first examine the case of a determinate 
balanced growth equilibrium. In Fig. 3, an increase in the extent to which the union is 
wage-oriented will shift the technology curve upward,9 and the new equilibrium 1E  
featuring a small l  and a small γ  will be obtained. At the old equilibrium point 0E  
the growth rate of consumption is less than that of technology, thus leading to a 
smaller nc . Therefore, employment will begin to rise, which in turn will drive the 
economy further away from the new balanced growth equilibrium. As a result, both l  
and γ  should instantaneously jump to the new balanced growth equilibrium. That is, 
if the union’s membership that prefers a higher labor wage has dominant power, this 
will cause the final goods firm’s costs to increase. Therefore, the final goods firm will 
employ less labor, and thus employment will decline. On the other hand, the fewer the 
intermediate goods that are used in the final goods market, the less R&D activity there 
will be, and thus less economic growth will be generated.   
    Conversely, in an indeterminate case, the new balanced growth equilibrium 1E  
will be located to the northeast of the original intersection point 0E  when the union 
is wage-oriented, as illustrated in Fig. 4. The figure shows that the union’s 
membership will boost economic growth and employment at point 1E . Because the 
ratio nc  declines, employment is increased. This movement in l  allows the 
economy to gradually approach the new balanced growth equilibrium. If the union is 
wage-oriented, the higher wage will increase the labor supply, and will thus increase 
employment. This will cause the final goods firm to increase the intermediate goods 
used, which will then increase the R&D activity. Thus the economic growth will be 
boosted.     
    Figs. 1 and 4 contribute to an important macro implication, that is, unionization 
will not necessarily be bad for employment and growth if the union is 
employment-oriented in a determinate equilibrium and is wage-oriented in an 
indeterminate equilibrium. This finding is as the same as those of Palokangas (1996), 
who provides an example to propound the possibly positive relationship between 
unionization and economic growth in an R&D growth model with two labor sectors 
(the skilled and unskilled sectors), Irmen and Wigger (2000), who develop an OLG 
                                                 
9
 See Eq. (A8) in Appendix 2. 
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model with a trade union and find that the unionization may lead to higher aggregate 
savings and per capita income growth, and Chang et al. (2007), who induces the 
internal conflict within a political union and indicates that a higher degree of 
unionization will result in a lower unemployment rate and a higher balanced growth 
rate if the union is employment-oriented in an AK growth model.  
    Figs. 2 and 3 provide that the unionization is not good for employment and 
growth if the union is employment-oriented in an indeterminate equilibrium and is 
wage-oriented in a determinate equilibrium. These results are the same as in Lingens 
(2007), who finds that unions would give rise to a hold-up problem which would 
decrease the incentive to invest in research, with the result that the rate of growth 
would decline, and Chang et al. (2007), who point out that unionization will harm 
both employment and growth if the union is wage-oriented.    
In a way that differs from their respective approaches, we abstract the interaction 
between sectors and the allocation of resources between sectors from our analysis and 
show that the endogenous labor supply can lead to fundamental changes in the 
stability of the long-run equilibrium. This is because the determinant of the Jacobian 
matrix of the dynamic system, evaluated at a steady state, will exhibit the opposite 
sign depending on whether the equilibrium is determinate or indeterminate. If 
indeterminacy occurs, the steady state comparative statics properties may be reversed. 
Hence, we provide a general outcome when the equilibrium is determinate or 
indeterminate and can explain the overall results for the relevant literature. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we incorporate a trade union into an R&D endogenous growth model 
with elastic labor. We show that the stability properties of the long-run equilibrium 
play a decisive role in the relationship between unionization, employment, and 
economic growth. Regardless of whether the balanced growth equilibrium is stable 
(indeterminate) or unstable (determinate), the influence on unionization will 
ambiguously improve economic growth and employment. If the households’ 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater (less) than 1, then the balanced 
growth equilibrium may be locally indeterminate (determinate). It may thus be 
concluded that when a balanced growth path displays indeterminacy, an increase in 
the extent to which the union is wage-oriented has a positive impact on long-run 
growth and employment. Furthermore, when a balanced growth path exhibits 
determinacy, a high degree of union bargaining power or a union that is 
employment-oriented will result in higher employment and a higher balanced growth 
rate.  
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Appendix 1 
Substituting Eq. (24) into Eq. (23), yields the optimal rate of growth of consumption 
as follows 
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By differentiating the right-hand side of Eq. (A1) with respect to lˆ  we obtain 
0ˆ1 112 >= −− αββα
σ
γ
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 (A2) 
which implies that the slope of the preference curve is positive. 
    As to the technology curve, differentiating Eq. (28) with respect to lˆ  leads to 
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which implies that the slope of the technology curve is also positive. 
    Combining Eq. (A3) with Eq. (A2), and using µαµ )1()( 1 −=+ −x  gives 
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Eq. (A4) reveals the sign of Eq. (31). By assuming that the brace on the right-hand 
side of Eq. (A4) is  
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we then have Proposition 1. 
 
Appendix 2 
By partially differentiating Eq. (28) with respect to θ , υ , and υ−1 , we obtain 
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